University of Bamberg
open search form
You are here

Faculty of Social Sciences, Economics, and Business Administration

Institute of Economics

  1.  University of bamberg
  2. Faculties
  3. Social Sciences, Economics and Business Administration
  4. Subjects and Institutes
  5. Institute of Economics
  6. News
  7. New BERG Working Paper No. 180 by Thomas Daske and Christoph March published

New BERG Working Paper No. 180 by Thomas Daske and Christoph March published

In the BERG Working Paper Series 180 Thomas Daske and Christoph March have published a new paper entitled "Efficient Incentives with Social Preferences*".

A complete overview of all BERG Working Papers published so far can be found here.

---

Abstract:

This study explores mechanism design with allocation-based social preferences. Agents’ social preferences and private payoffs are all subject to asymmetric information. We assume quasi-linear utility and independent types. We show how the asymmetry of information about agents’ social preferences can be operationalized to satisfy agents’ participation constraints. Our main result is a possibility result for groups of at least three agents: If endowments are sufficiently large, any such group can resolve any given allocation problem with an ex-post budget-balanced mechanism that is Bayesian incentive-compatible, interim individually rational, and ex-post Pareto-efficient.